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THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE, THE
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DOCTRINE, AND
THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES
ACT. A ROAD MAP FOR THE
EXPROPRIATED VICTIM
I. INTRODUCTION
As American corporations and individuals increase their in-
vestments abroad, they are inevitably subject to political risks.
Foreign countries often infringe on the property interests of the
American investor. The taking of property by foreign sover-
eigns, under the guise of either eminent domain or nationaliza-
tion, gives rise to litigation involving the legality of
expropriation. "Unfortunately, the courts in the United States
have not always done well in handling issues of international
law, particularly in the expropriation context."1
The United States courts are unwilling to adjudicate expro-
priation claims because of the act of state doctrine, the asser-
tions of foreign sovereigns to immunity, and other related
jurisdictional and political issues which limit the courts' power.
This article will analyze these limitations on the courts' power.
It will focus on the history and rationales of both the act of state
doctrine and the theory of foreign immunities as shown by case
law. It will then examine whether a claimant whose property
has been expropriated can sue the foreign sovereign in the
courts of the United States. This article provides an overview of
the factors that an expropriated victim will encounter in suing a
1 Symposium, Adjudication of Foreign Expropriations in U.S. Courts, 77 Am.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 335 (1985).
1
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foreign sovereign. The goal is to provide information in further-
ance of the understanding of the act of state doctrine, the sover-
eign immunity doctrine, the foreign sovereign immunities
statute, and other issues that can stand in the way of an expro-
priated claimant.
Part II of the article begins with an historical approach to
the background of the act of state doctrine and the sovereign
immunity doctrine. It will show the definitions, origins, poli-
cies, and the comparisons of each doctrine.
Part III provides the substantive analysis, starting with
the international law on expropriation and the Executive
Branch's view towards bringing a foreign sovereign into the
United States courts. The discussion examines the Cuban ex-
propriation cases which provide the impetus for the legislation
limiting the act of state doctrine by the Hickenlooper Amend-
ment,2 and the codification of the sovereign immunity doctrine
by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.3 The Hickenlooper
Amendment and the FSIA will be introduced and analyzed,
4
along with case law to show the interactions and interpreta-
tions of these statutes with the act of state and the sovereign
immunity doctrines.
Lastly, this article presents a synthesis of existing case law,
explaining the subtleties presented by the cases, and evaluating
the courts' performances in adjudicating expropriation claims.
It is the author's final assessment that most expropriation vic-
tims will not be able to obtain relief from the United States judi-
ciary due to its inclination to apply the act of state doctrine and
its inconsistent interpretation of the FSIA.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Act of State Doctrine
The act of state doctrine took root in England as early as
1674, and sprouted in the jurisprudence of the United States in
2 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1994) [hereinafter Hickenlooper Amendment]. See
infra note 86.
3 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1994) [hereinafter FSIA]. See infra notes
126, 132, 133.
4 For a pertinent article concerning the interaction of the act of state doctrine
and the FSIA, see Ifeanyi Achebe, The Act of State Doctrine and Foreign Immuni-
ties Act of 1976: Can They Coexist? 13 MD J. IN'L L. & TRADE 247 (1989).
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the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 5 The act of
state doctrine holds that "the Judicial Branch will not examine
the validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a
foreign sovereign government ... in the absence of a treaty or
other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal prin-
ciples, even if the complaint alleges that the taking violates cus-
tomary international law."6 In 1812, Justice Marshall in The
Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon7 articulated the concept of the
act of state doctrine, though he did not specify it as such. There,
the plaintiff sought attachment of a ship he claimed was forcibly
taken from him by order of Napoleon, the Emperor of France.8
The Supreme Court held that a nation's limitation on jurisdic-
tion is its implied consent to waive its jurisdiction, 9 and justi-
fied the waiver of jurisdiction on diplomatic and policy
grounds. 10 The act of state doctrine can be explained as
follows:
Every sovereign [s]tate is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign [sitate, and the courts of one country will
not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done
within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such
acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by
sovereign powers as between themselves. 1
In 1918, the act of state doctrine was used to validate the
takings of property by the Mexican government. In Oetjen v.
Central Leather Co.,1 2 the plaintiff, the assignee of the original
owner, sought to replevy property that the Mexican government
seized from the original owner.' 3 The Supreme Court held that
5 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964). For com-
parisons of the usage of the act of state doctrine in other countries, see the list of
citations found in Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 421 n.21.
6 Id. at 428.
7 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
8 Id. Because the ship sailed into a United States seaport during a storm,
the plaintiff attempted to invoke a United States court's jurisdiction. Id. at 118.
9 Id. at 146.
10 Id.
11 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). This explanation is cited
with approval in Sabbatino as "[tihe classic American statement of the act of state
doctrine." 376 U.S. at 416.
12 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
13 Id. at 299-301. In the Mexican revolution, the army assessed a military
contribution on the original owner, who refused to pay. Id. The army subse-
3
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under the political question and the act of state doctrines, "the
conduct of one independent government cannot be successfully
questioned in the courts of another" even if the court has the
custody of the property in question.14 This is because both doc-
trines are based on the "highest considerations of international
comity and expediency," 15 and "[tlo permit the validity of the
acts of one sovereign state to be reexamined and perhaps con-
demned by the courts of another"16 will result in hostile foreign
relations.' 7
In Ricaud v. American Metal Co.,' 8 the plaintiff, a pur-
chaser from the original owner before the expropriation, sued to
recover his property. 19 The Court clarified that the act of state
doctrine "does not deprive the courts of jurisdiction once ac-
quired over a case."20 If the foreign government took action in
confiscating property, such act or the result of such act must be
accepted by the United States courts. The Court opined that
"[t]o accept a ruling authority and to decide accordingly is not a
surrender or abandonment of jurisdiction but is an exercise of
it."21 The Court exercised jurisdiction and accepted the Mexi-
can government's taking of property to deprive the plaintiff of
ownership.22 The act of state doctrine can be rationalized as:
quently seized and sold the property to a predecessor in interest of the defendant.
Id. The plaintiff alleged that he is the original owner's assignee. Id.
14 Id. at 303.
15 Id. at 303-304. The Court cited Underhill and American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1908), to support the application of the act of state
doctrine. Id. at 303.
16 Oetjen, 246 U.S. 297, 303 (1918).
17 Id.
18 246 U.S. 304 (1918).
19 Id. at 306-310. The expropriation occurred in September, 1913, during the
Mexican Revolution, where a Mexican Army General allegedly took lead bullions
from the plaintiff's successor in interest, a Mexican corporation that was the origi-
nal owner. Id. To raise money for the revolution to buy weapons, the Army Gen-
eral subsequently sold the lead bullions to the defendants. Id. The plaintiff's
contention is that he bought from the original owner in June, 1913. Id. at 305-308.
20 Id. at 309.
21 Id.
22 Ricaud, 246 U.S. 304, 307-310. Assuming that the facts as alleged by the
plaintiff as true, as the Court did, the plaintiff's chain of title can be traced back to
the original owner, and since it received its title first in time, before the Mexican
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[A] judicially accepted limitation on the normative adjudicative
processes of the courts, springing from the thoroughly sound prin-
ciple that on occasion individual litigants may have to forgo deci-
sion on the merits of their claims because the involvement of the
courts in such a decision might frustrate the conduct of the Na-
tion's foreign policy. 23
The rationale of the doctrine is "grounded on judicial con-
cern that application of the customary principles of law to judge
the acts of a foreign sovereign might frustrate the conduct of
foreign relations by the political branches of the government."
24
The notion is that, if the court deals with the foreign sovereign
in one way, and the Executive Branch conducts its foreign rela-
tions in conflict with what the court decided, there will be no
unity in conducting foreign affairs. This stems from the separa-
tion of powers inherent in the federal system.25
These cases show that if a foreign sovereign is involved in
the expropriation, the traditional form of the act of state doc-
trine validates what the sovereign did through judicial restraint
and refusal to extend jurisdiction. The effect of the doctrine is
to deprive the true owner of his or her property interest. Re-
gardless of how unfair the taking was, the courts will not ques-
tion the merits of the foreign sovereign's expropriation. As a
result, the principles of equity and fairness are not considered
in the determination because the courts refrain from deciding at
all.
B. The Sovereign Immunity Doctrine
Sovereign immunity is very similar to the act of state doc-
trine in that both doctrines have a common source originating
from The Schooner Exchange26 case. "[B]oth the act of state and
the sovereign immunity doctrines are judicially created to effec-
tuate general notions of comity among nations and among the
respective branches of the Federal Government."27 The general
rule is that "sovereigns are not presumed without explicit decla-
ration to have opened their tribunals to suits against other sov-
23 First Natl City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 769 (1972).
24 Id. at 767.
26 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964).
26 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
27 First Nat'l City Bank, 406 U.S. at 762.
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ereigns."28 The effect of applying the sovereign immunity
doctrine is that a foreign sovereign is free from being haled into
court as a defendant. 29
The sovereign immunity doctrine was in existence as early
as 1781, and has since become "part of the fabric" of American
jurisprudence.30 The Supreme Court noted that "the privileged
position of a foreign state [from being sued] is not an explicit
command of the Constitution . . . [but] [i]t rests on considera-
tions of policy given legal sanctions by [the] Court."31
The Supreme Court's use of the sovereign immunity doc-
trine in allowing foreign expropriation of American property
can be seen in the maritime cases. In deciding The Schooner
Exchange,3 2 the Supreme Court used the sovereign immunity
doctrine to absolve France of wrongdoing and rationalize its
finding that the military ship in question was immune from at-
tachment.33 In 1926, the Supreme Court decided Berizzi Bros.
Co. v. The Pesaro.3 4 That case arose out of a contract claim by
the plaintiff seeking an action in rem to arrest a ship owned by
the government of Italy, but the Court held that "merchant
ships owned and operated by a foreign government have the
same immunity that war ships have."35 Thus, any property
owned by a foreign government, whether its usage is for mili-
tary or commercial purposes, is immune from attachment and
execution. In a similar case in 1943, in Ex Parte Republic of
Peru., The Ucayali,36 the Court held that "the judicial seizure of
28 Id. at 763 (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900)).
29 National City Bank of N.Y. v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 358 (1955).
30 Id. The Court pointed to De Moitez v. The South Carolina, 17 F.Cas. 574
(Adm. Pa. 1781). Id.
31 Id. at 359.
32 See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
33 For an overview of the factors leading to the Court's decision, see generally
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 135-147 (1812). In the Schooner Exchange case, the Court
gives deference to France. Id. Justice Marshall phrased the issue as "whether an
American citizen can assert, in an American court, a title to an armed national
vessel...." Id. at 135. The emphasis seemed to be on the military, as opposed to
the commercial, status of the ship; this distinction is misplaced, however, as Be-
rizzi Bros. Co. v. The Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926), shows that a foreign sovereign
owned commercial ship has immunity from attachment as well. See infra text ac-
companying notes 34 and 35.
34 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
35 Id. at 576.
36 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
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the vessel of a friendly sovereign state is so serious a challenge
to its dignity, and may so affect our friendly relations with it", 3 v
that foreign sovereign immunity must be granted unless the
Executive Branch says otherwise. 38
In 1945, Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman 39 indicated a more
restrictive view of sovereign immunity in a tort action. The
Supreme Court held that in an in rem action based on a judicial
seizure of a foreign government's property, a court must dismiss
the case if the Executive Branch advises the court of the foreign
sovereign's immunity.40 If the Executive Branch expresses no
specific view on the matter, the court may decide whether there
is immunity in accordance with United States governmental
policies, which may be reflected from past positions endorsed by
the State Department. 41 Under the facts of Hoffman, a ship
was seized pursuant to an in rem proceeding. 42 The Court held
that even though Mexico owned the ship, it was not immune
because it did not possess the ship. There must be formal gov-
ernmental action by the foreign government to take the
property.
Only The Schooner Exchange43 involved an expropriation
claim, but the other cases show the contour of the sovereign im-
munity doctrine. The factors in the sovereign immunity doc-
trine analysis are similar to those of the act of state doctrine.
They involve consideration of comity and the risk of inter-
branch conflicts in the United States foreign relations area.
Like the act of state doctrine, if a foreign sovereign is involved
in the expropriation and if the foreign sovereign is entitled to
immunity, the courts will not have jurisdiction. The effect of
applying either doctrine is the same: the property interest of the
true owner will not be enforced in the United States courts.
37 Id. at 588.
38 Id. The Court quoted United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882), as its au-
thority for judicial deference to the political branches of the government. Id.
39 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
40 Id. at 34-36.
41 Id. at 36.
42 Id. at 31. Plaintiff's cause of action is a libel in rem, based on tort, seeking
attachment of a Mexican ship that involved in a collusion with his ship. Id.
4 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
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C. Distinctions Between the Act of State and the Sovereign
Immunity Doctrines
The act of state doctrine can be viewed in terms of jus-
ticiability and concerns the "appropriateness of the subject mat-
ter for judicial resolution."44 It requires "that a court, after
exercising jurisdiction, decline to review certain issues, in par-
ticular, the validity or propriety of foreign acts of state."45 It is
an affirmative defense by the sovereign. In contrast, the sover-
eign immunity doctrine is akin to jurisdiction and "concerns the
court's power over the parties .. ".."46 It is "jurisdictional in
nature, [i]f sovereign immunity exists, then the court lacks both
personal and subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case.... ,,47
Even though these doctrines are different, it must be em-
phasized that the issues involved in analyzing whether to apply
these doctrines overlap. The issues of respecting the dignity
and independence of the sovereigns, and the avoidance of inter-
branch conflict in foreign relations are at the heart of each doc-
trine.48 Because these issues form the basis of each doctrine,
the application of each doctrine is very fact-specific and involves
analyzing the potential harm to United States foreign relations
if a court is to decide the expropriation claim. Nonetheless, the
doctrines' rationales justify their continued vitality. Having
thus established the definitions and the rationales of both doc-
44 First Natl City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 774 (1972)
(Powell, J., concurring).
45 De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicar., 770 F.2d 1385, 1389 (5th Cir. 1985)
(citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421-23 (1964)). See
W.S. Kirkpartrick v. Environmental Tectonics, 493 U.S. 400, 406 (1990) (holding
that "[a]ct of state issues only arise when a court must decide - when the outcome
of the case turns upon - the effect of official action by a foreign sovereign."); see also
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), rev'd on other grounds
on remand sub nom. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 180 (2d Cir.
1967) (stating that the act of state is a rule of discretion, a judicial abstention
policy "based on the [court's] estimation of the political effects that would follow
from a judicial review of acts of foreign states ... ).
46 First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 774 (1972)
(Powell, J., concurring).
47 De Sanchez, 770 F.2d at 1389.
48 See, e.g., Asociacion De Reclamantes v. United Mexican States, 561 F.
Supp. 1190, 1198-99 (D.D.C. 1983) (quoting Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers v. Org. of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 649 F.2d 1354, 1359 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied 454 U.S. 1163 (1982)), aff'd, 735 F.2d 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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trines, the analysis turns to the codification of these doctrines
and their effect on an expropriated victim.
III. ANALYSIS
From the maritime cases above, especially Republic of Mex-
ico v. Hoffman,49 there is a trend towards narrowing the act of
state doctrine, and towards the erosion of absolute sovereign
immunity. In 1964 this trend led to a codification to limit the
act of state doctrine in expropriation cases through the Hick-
enlooper Amendment. 50 The limitations on sovereign immunity
were codified in 1976 in the FSIA.51 The Hickenlooper Amend-
ment provides an exception to the act of state doctrine, whereas
the FSIA provides exceptions to the sovereign immunity doc-
trine. The following sets out the international law on expropri-
ation, the Executive Branch's view on this issue, and traces the
cases that led to the Hickenlooper Amendment and the FSIA.
Additionally, the case law will supply insights on the Hick-
enlooper Amendment and the FSIA, both statutes that continue
to affect an expropriated victim when attempting to sue a for-
eign sovereign for the loss of his or her property in a United
States court.
A. The International Law on Expropriation
The procedural issues of the act of state doctrine (jus-
ticiability) and the sovereign immunity doctrine (jurisdiction)
as encompassed in the Hickenlooper Amendment and the FSIA,
are closely connected with the substantive issue of whether the
taking of property violates international law. This is so because
there is no relief unless the expropriation was a violation of
49 324 U.S. 30 (1945). See also In re Muir, 254 U.S. 522 (1921) (holding that
there is no immunity where a privately owned ship was performing public service
for the British government); The Gul Djemal, 264 U.S. 90 (1924) (holding that
there is no immunity where a ship owned by the Turkish government was seized
for in rem jurisdiction because it was engaged in private charter and was sailing
for commercial, not military purposes).
50 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1994). See infra note 86. See, e.g., Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F. Supp. 166 (2d Cir. 1967).
51 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1994). See infra notes 126, 132, 133. See
generally Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480 (1983); Argentine
Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping, 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
9
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law.5 2 Therefore, the relevant inquiry should focus on the treat-
ment of expropriation under international law.
Though there is considerable disagreement in the interna-
tional community on the precise international law of expropria-
tion, there is agreement among international tribunals,
arbitration boards, scholars, and commentators that a taking
will violate international law if it is not for a public purpose, "is
discriminatory, or does not provide for prompt, adequate, and
effective compensation."53 This standard of international law
gained support, and is defined in the RESTATEMENT (THMID) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 712 as follows: "A state is re-
sponsible under international law for injury resulting from: (1)
a taking by the state of the property of a national of another
state that (a) is not for a public purpose, or (b) is discriminatory,
or (c) is not accompanied by provision for just compensation
"54
B. The Department of State Letters
Establishing the international law on expropriation does
not end the inquiry. Before the enactment of the Hickenlooper
Amendment and the FSIA, an expropriation victim attempting
to sue a foreign sovereign in a United States court will also need
to address the problem posed by the United States' governmen-
tal structure. Because foreign relations are uniquely in the
realm of the political branches,55 the courts are extremely defer-
ential to the other branches of the Federal Government when
deciding whether to apply the act of state and sovereign immu-
nity doctrines.5 6 Prior to the enactment of the Hickenlooper
52 See, e.g., De Sanchez v. Banco Cent. de Nicar., 770 F.2d 1385, 1395-96 (5th
Cir. 1985).
53 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 429 n.27-30 (1964).
The Supreme Court cited various international law cases, United Nations Arbitra-
tions Awards cases, United States Department of States Letters, and the Restate-
ment of Foreign Relations Law of the United States for this principle. Id.
54 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 712 (1987), quoted in Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d
699, 712 (9th Cir. 1992).
m See, e.g., Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (stating
that the Constitution committed foreign relations to the Executive and Legislative
Branches of the Federal Government).
56 See, e.g., Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 302 (Act of State - deference to political
branches), Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918) (Act of State -
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Amendment, the Executive Branch's policy towards applying
the act of state doctrine varied on a case-by-case basis, as can be
seen in the Bernstein Letters.57 Likewise, before the FSIA, the
Executive Branch's policy in extending sovereign immunity to
only the public acts of a foreign state can be seen in the Tate
Letter in 1952. 51 With the Hickenlooper Amendment and the
FSIA, Congress reduced the need for the courts to consult with
the Executive Branch's Department of State.5 9 The next stage
of the analysis concentrates on the development of the Hick-
enlooper Amendment and the FSIA.
C. Case Law - Limiting the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine,
Before the Hickenlooper Amendment and the FSIA
National City Bank of New York v. Republic of China60 be-
gan the limitation on the absolute sovereign immunity doc-
recognition of a foreign government dependent on political branches), Underhill v.
Hernanez, 168 U.S. 250, 253 (1897) (Act of State and Sovereign Immunity - consul-
tation with the Department of State), Ex Parte Republic of Peru., The Ucayali, 318
U.S. 578, 588 (1943) (Sovereign Immunity - courts may follow the action of the
political branch), Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34-36 (1945) (Sover-
eign Immunity - following the Executive Branch), Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v.
Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 699 n.14 (1976), citing Republic of Mexico v. Hoff-
man, 324 U.S. 30,40-42 (1945) (J. Frankfurther, concurring) (Sovereign Immunity
- courts following political branches' positions).
57 Bernstein Letters are letters issued by the Executive Branch's Department
of State that express its view as to whether the courts should apply the act of state
doctrine in any particular case in question. See Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres
Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947), and Bernstein v. N.V. Neder-
landsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
See infra note 92.
58 Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, Department of State, to
Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v.
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711 (1976). The Tate Letter expressed the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity, in which the foreign government is entitled to immunity only
for its public acts, but not for its private, commercial acts. Id.
59 The goal of the Hickenlooper Amendment is to ensure that an expropriated
victim can have his case adjudicated and the goal of the FSIA is to ensure that the
adjudication is based solely on legal grounds and not political grounds. Banco Na-
cional de Cuba v. Fan, 383 F.2d 166, 175 (2d Cir. 1967). See generally Verlinden
B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983).
60 348 U.S. 356 (1955). The plaintiff, an agency of the government of China,
deposited funds with the defendant, a New York bank. Id. at 357. The plaintiff
sought to withdraw the deposits, but the defendant refused to pay. Id. The plain-
tiff then sued in the district court, and the defendant New York bank counter-
claimed, alleging that the plaintiff previously owed it some debt. Id.
11
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trine. 61 The Supreme Court stated that advice from the State
Department is to be accorded "significant weight" by the judici-
ary. 62 The Court reasoned that if the foreign sovereign sought
the jurisdiction of the United States court initially, it was equi-
table to hold the sovereign liable on the counterclaim.63 A for-
eign government cannot initially seek the assistance of our law,
yet resist justice by claiming immunity against a counter-
claim.64 The consideration of fair dealing overrides the minimal
damage to foreign relations in such a situation and "a counter-
claim based on the subject matter of a sovereign's suit is al-
lowed to cut into the doctrine of immunity."65 Moreover, the
sovereign immunity doctrine must be considered in light of fun-
damental fairness. 66 The Court's decision in this case is codified
in the FSIA section 1607(c). 67
D. Case Law - The Precursors to the Hickenlooper
Amendment and the FSIA
Decisions by the Supreme Court prompted Congress to leg-
islate by limiting the act of state and the sovereign immunity
doctrines with the Hickenlooper Amendment and the FSIA, re-
spectively. By examining the path that led to the legislation,
one can stand to gain a clearer understanding. The following
cases trace these Supreme Court decisions.
1. The Cuban Expropriation Cases68
The progress towards limiting the act of state and the sov-
ereign immunity doctrines come in a series of decisions that
61 Id.
62 Id. at 360. The Court was referring to the Tate Letter. Id. at 360-361. See
supra note 58.
63 348 U.S. 356, 364-66.
64 Id. at 361-62.
65 National City Bank of New York v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 364
(1955).
66 Id. See generally Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 438
(1964).
67 28 U.S.C. § 1607(c) (1994). See First Natl City Bank v. Banco Para El Co-
mercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 620 n.7 (1983) and infra note 133.
68 See generally, Mary W. Kenny, Expropriation of Offshore Branches of
American Banks Located in Foreign Tax Havens, 14 INT'L LAw. 286 (1980), and
Paul N. Filzer, The Continued Viability of the Act of State Doctrine in Foreign
Branch Bank Expropriation Cases, 3 Am. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 99 (1988).
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arose from Cuba's expropriation of United States corporations'
property. The cases are Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabba-
tino,69 First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,
70
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,71 and First
National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de
Cuba.72 The facts of each case are similar. Each involved the
Cuban government's confiscation of properties owned by United
States corporations. The Cuban government or its instrumen-
tality sued the United States defendants, who sought dismissal
or counterclaimed as a setoff for the properties taken.
a). Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino73
The seminal case of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino74
led to legislation through the enactment of the Hickenlooper
Amendment. In Sabbatino, the issue was whether the act of
state doctrine precluded United States courts from examining
the validity of a discriminatory and non-compensated taking
which violated international law. 75 The Supreme Court held
that international law does not mandate or forbid the use of the
act of state doctrine even if the taking violated international
law, and the usual method for an individual to seek relief is to
exhaust local remedies, to sue in an international tribunal, or to
seek diplomatic efforts by the Executive Branch.76 The United
States Constitution does not require the act of state doctrine,
69 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
70 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
71 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
72 462 U.S. 611 (1983).
73 376 U.S. 398 (1964). See generally Monroe Leigh, Sabbatino's Silver
Anniversary and the Restatement: No Cause for Celebration, 24 INT'L LAw. 1
(1990).
74 376 U.S. 398 (1964). The plaintiff, a Cuban bank which is an instrumental-
ity of the Cuban government, sued a United States importer and a court appointed
temporary receiver of an expropriated Cuban corporation for the conversion of bills
of lading and funds. Id. at 401-07. Cuba expropriated a shipment of sugar that
was owned by a Cuban corporation, a subsidiary of the United States importer. Id.
The expropriation discriminated against United States nationals, did not provide
for adequate compensation, and was in retaliation for a United States imposed
sugar quota. Id. at 401, 429, 433.
75 Id. at 400, 415, 420-31.
76 Id. at 422-23. Specifically, the Court opined that the Executive Branch's
expertise in diplomacy can assure that United States citizens who are harmed are
compensated fairly through agreements with United Nations, or through economic
and political sanctions. Id. at 431. The Court noted that the President can pres-
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but the rationale of doctrine is based upon the separation of
powers. 77 The Court held that "the greater the degree of codifi-
cation or consensus concerning a particular area of interna-
tional law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary"78 to
decide accordingly, without conflicting with the political
branches of the government.7 9 It stated that "the less impor-
tant the implications of an issue are for our foreign relations,
the weaker the justification for exclusivity in the political
branches." 0 Thus, where there is no agreement among the var-
ious branches of the government as to the applicable rule of
law,81 the act of state doctrine applies to presume the validity of
the act of the foreign sovereign.
The Court noted that the alternative means of redress by
the Executive Branch is more effective than the judiciary piece-
meal approach,82 and hinted that the Bernstein Letter does not
provide an exception to the act of state doctrine.8 3 It then dis-
tinguished National City Bank of New York v. Republic of
China8 4 because that case focused on the sovereign immunity
doctrine, as opposed to the act of state doctrine.8 5
In reaction to the Supreme Court's Sabbatino decision,
Congress enacted the Hickenlooper Amendment.8 6 The legisla-
sure the foreign government by manipulating the use of foreign aid and economic
embargos. Id. at 435-36.
77 Id. at 423. The Court held that in terms of conflict of laws, federal law
applies. Id. at 426. The Court also stated that the act of state doctrine is binding
upon federal and state courts, but was not mandated by the Constitution or by
international law. Id. at 421-23.
78 Id. at 428.
79 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1972).
0 Id.
81 See generally Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
See supra note 53 and accompanying text and infra note 157.
82 Id. at 432. See supra note 76.
83 Id. at 436. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
84 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 438 (distinguishing National City Bank of N.Y. v.
Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955)). The Sabbatino Court also reasoned that
since the Bank of N.Y. case involved the inapplicability of the sovereign immunity
doctrine in a counterclaim against the foreign government, the choice of law rules
from that case - that the forum should apply its local law - was irrelevant in the act
of state doctrine analysis. Id.
85 376 U.S. at 438.
86 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1994). The relevant portion of the law states that:
[N]o court in the United States shall decline on the ground of the fed-
eral act of state doctrine to make a determination on the merits giving effect
to the principles of international law in a case in which a claim of title or
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol8/iss1/5
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tive intent of the Amendment was to reverse the presumption of
the application of the act of state doctrine.8 7 In addition, Con-
gress sought to "discourage illegal confiscations by foreign gov-
ernments in violation of international law....- 8 8
In light of the Hickenlooper Amendment, when the case
was on remand from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals
held that under the Hickenlooper Amendment, the act of state
doctrine is inapplicable where the expropriation by the foreign
government violated international law and where the President
did not oppose adjudication on the merits.8 9
b). First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba9°
The Supreme Court again addressed the act of state doc-
trine in First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba.91
This case presented two issues illustrating the scope of the
Hickenlooper Amendment. First, the case addressed whether
the Hickenlooper Amendment applied to preclude the act of
state doctrine; second, it discussed whether the act of state doc-
other right to property is asserted by any party including a foreign state (or
a party claiming through such state) based upon (or traced through) a con-
fiscation or other taking after January 1, 1959, by an act of that state in
violation of... international law... [but the law].., shall not be applicable
... [if] the President determines that application of the act of state doctrine
is required in that particular case by the foreign policy interests of the
United States ....
Id.
87 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957, 963 (S.D.N.Y., 1965)
(quoting S. REP. No. 1188, Part I, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1964), reprinted in
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3852), aff'd, 383 F.2d 166, 174 (2d Cir. 1967).
88 243 F. Supp. at 966.
89 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967).
90 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
91 Id. Specifically, this case is important to illustrate the scope of the Hick-
enlooper Amendment and for its holding that the act of state doctrine is inapplica-
ble where the Court was advised by the Executive Branch not to apply the
doctrine. Under the facts of the case, the plaintiff, a Cuban bank, needed a loan
and had pledged collateral to the defendant, a New York Bank. Id. at 760. Upon
Cuba's expropriation of the defendant's branches located in Cuba, the defendant
sold the collateral for an amount in excess of the loan. Id. at 760, 778-79. The
dispute concerned the issue of whether the defendant New York bank could assert
a counterclaim as a setoff as against the plaintiff Cuban bank the money from the
sale of the collateral. Id. at 779 n.3.
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trine should apply if the Executive Branch issued a Bernstein
Letter.9 2
With respect to the first issue, the Court held that the Hick-
enlooper Amendment is applicable only if the specific expropri-
ated property is in question, but is inapplicable to an unrelated
property.93 On the second issue, the plurality opinion in this
case generated heated debates concerning the amount of defer-
ence to be accorded to the Bernstein Letters. 94 One can argue
that a Bernstein Letter provides an exception to the act of state
doctrine. 95 The rationale is that there will be no inter-branch
conflict in the conduct of foreign relations if the Executive
Branch tells the Court not to apply the doctrine by issuance of a
Bernstein Letter, because the justification for the doctrine, pre-
vention of embarrassment of the political branch in conducting
foreign relations, is eliminated. 96 Ultimately, the plurality of
the Court held that suggestions from the Executive Branch in a
Bernstein Letter were not exceptions to the act of state
doctrine.97
92 406 U.S. 759 (1972). The Bernstein Letter exception to the act of state doc-
trine was an undecided issue in Sabbatino. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398, 419-20 (1964); see supra note 83 and accompanying text. In the in-
stant case, the Department of State's Legal Advisor sent a Bernstein Letter indi-
cating that the Executive Branch determined that applying the act of state
doctrine would not further the foreign relations of the United States. Banco Na-
cional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 442 F.2d 530, 536-38 (2d Cir.
1971). See supra note 57.
93 First Nat'l City Bank of N.Y. v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 780
n.5 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (examining legislative history and quoting
Hickenlooper Amendment, 1965: Hearings on H.R. 7750 Before the House Commit-
tee on Foreign Affairs, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 578 (1965) (colloquy between Professor
Olmstead and Congressman Fraser)).
94 Id. at 768, 773, 777. Three Justices opined that there is a Bernstein excep-
tion to the act of state doctrine, whereas, two concurring Justices and four dissent-
ing Justices, opined that there is no Bernstein exception. Id.
95 Id. at 768.
96 Id. at 765. The Court distinguished Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398 (1964), because in Sabbatino the Executive Branch declined to com-
ment on whether the act of state doctrine should apply. See supra note 83 and
accompanying text.
97 Id. at 776-793 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The concurring and the dissenting
opinions gathered enough votes on rejecting the Bernstein Letter as an exception
to the act of state doctrine. Id. In part, because of the divided opinions in this
case, Congress codified the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity from the Tate
Letter, in the FSIA. See supra note 58.
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol8/iss1/5
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c). Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba98
In Alfred Dunhill,99 the Supreme Court reviewed the act of
state doctrine and the Hickenlooper Amendment in the context
of commercial litigation. The Supreme Court held that the for-
eign government has the burden of proving the act of state doc-
trine applied, although there was no consensus among the
justices on the issue of whether there is a commercial activity
exception to the act of state doctrine.100 Nonetheless, the Court
held that if the foreign state failed to prove that it acted in a
public and sovereign capacity, rather than in a private and com-
mercial capacity, the act of state doctrine does not apply.10 1 In
addition, the Supreme Court held that the Hickenlooper
Amendment is inapplicable to a contractual claim. ' 02 This deci-
sion had the effect of narrowing the act of state doctrine.
d). First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio
Exterior de Cuba10 3
The Supreme Court used its equity power to compensate
the expropriated victim in First National City Bank v. Banco
Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba. 1 0 4 The issue was whether a
United States court would exercise its equity power to pierce
the corporate veil of an entity that had expropriated a United
98 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
99 Id. The properties in dispute are the accounts payable which arose from
shipments of cigars. Id. at 685-686. The plaintiffs, the former owners of the expro-
priated property and the Cuban government, sued the defendants, American im-
porters of the cigars. Id. The American importers counterclaimed as against the
Cuban government a setoff of the amount that they mistakenly paid to Cuba. Id.
at 685-88.
100 Id. at 691-94. Four justices opined that the commercial exception to the
sovereign immunity doctrine, pursuant to the Tate Letter, applies equally to the
act of state doctrine. Id. at 695-706. Four dissenting justices rejected that there is
a commercial activity exception to the act of state doctrine. Id. at 724-725.
101 Id.
102 Alfred Dunhill, 425 U.S. 682, 689 n.4 (holding that the Hickenlooper
Amendment does not apply to contractual claims involving expropriated property).
But see, e.g., West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 829-30 (9th Cir.
1987) (holding that contractual claims are included within the Hickenlooper
Amendment); see infra note 153.
103 462 U.S. 611 (1983).
104 Id. The plaintiff, a Cuban bank, sued the defendant, a United States bank,
on an unpaid letter of credit. Id. at 613-20. The defendant United States bank
counterclaimed, but did not seek affirmative recovery as a setoff for its expropri-
ated branches in Cuba. Id. at 616.
17
PACE INT'L L. REV.
States corporation's property.' 05 The plaintiff Cuban bank ar-
gued that because it was a separate entity from the Cuban gov-
ernment, it could not be held liable for that government's
expropriations. 10 6 On the basis of fundamental fairness, the
Court held that the presumption of the separate legal entity
would be disregarded. 10 7 The Court also interpreted the FSIA
and held the plaintiff liable on the defendant's counterclaim.10 8
2. Implications and Effects of the Cuban Expropriation Cases
The Cuban expropriation cases spanned from 1961 to
1987.109 They provided extensive treatment of the act of state
and the sovereign immunity doctrines. The cases can be sum-
marized as follows: the Supreme Court's comprehensive discus-
sion of the act of state doctrine in Sabbatino"0 continued to be
valid, even if its specific holding was overruled by the Hick-
enlooper Amendment.' 1 ' There is no Bernstein Letter excep-
tion to the act of state doctrine according to First National City
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba.112 Alfred Dunhill 1 3 stands
for the proposition that the foreign government has the burden
of proving the act of state doctrine. 1 4 However, as a result of
the divided opinions in Banco National de Cuba with regard to
the Bernstein Letter exception to the act of state doctrine and
Alfred Dunhill with regard to the Tate Letter's restrictive the-
ory of sovereign immunity," 5 Congress enacted the FSIA. In
105 Id. at 613, 628-34.
106 Id. at 633.
107 Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611,630-34. The Court
held that "government instrumentalities established as juridical entities distinct
and independent from their sovereign should normally be treated as such." Id. at
626. However, "Cuba cannot escape liability for acts in violation of international
law simply by retransferring the assets to separate juridical entities." Id. at 633.
108 Id. at 630. The Court focused on 28 U.S.C. § 1607(c) and noted that "Itihe
language and the history of the FSIA clearly establish that the Act was not in-
tended to affect the substantive law determining the liability of a foreign state or
instrumentality .... " Id. at 620; see infra note 133.
109 The cases range from Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp.
375 (S.D.N.Y., 1961) to Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co.,
822 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1987).
110 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
111 See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
112 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
113 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
114 Id. at 681-84.
115 See supra notes 94-97, 100 and accompanying text.
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the adjudication of expropriation claims, a separate legal entity
will be disregarded if equity so requires, according to First Na-
tional City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de
Cuba.116 The common thread among these cases is that the ex-
propriated United States litigants are defendants, and their
claims for expropriation arise only as counterclaims or offsets to
the original claims by the Cuban government or its
instrumentalities. 117
In short, Sabbatino led to the enactment of the Hick-
enlooper Amendment.1 8 In First National City Bank v. Banco
Nacional de Cuba and Alfred Dunhill, the Court interpreted the
Hickenlooper Amendment. 1 9 First National City Bank v.
Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba suggested that equity
principles can help the expropriation victim. 120 Collectively,
the Cuban expropriation cases led to the enactment of the
FSIA.' 2 ' The next stage of the analysis describes the FSIA and
its effect on the expropriated victims.
E. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)122
The Supreme Court's comment in Sabbatino 23 not only led
to Congressional reaction by enacting the Hickenlooper Amend-
ment to limit the act of state doctrine, but also led to further
codification of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.' 24 In at-
tempting to address the issue of whether a foreign sovereign is
entitled to immunity, the FSIA has been severely criticized as a
legislative muddle because its statutory drafting and construc-
tion is confusing. 125 The purpose of the FSIA is stated in sec-
116 462 U.S. 611 (1983).
117 See supra notes 74, 91, 99, and 104.
118 See supra note 86 and accompanying text and text accompanying notes 87-
88.
119 See supra text accompanying notes 93 and 102.
120 See supra text accompanying note 104 and note 107 and accompanying
text.
121 See supra text accompanying note 115.
122 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1994). See generally, Mark B. Feldman, The
United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 in Perspective: A
Founder's View, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 302 (1986).
123 376 U.S. 398 (1964). See supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
124 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1994).
125 See Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp. 1094, 1105 (S.D.N.Y.
1982), where the court described the FSIA as a "statutory labyrinth that, owing to
the numerous interpretive questions engendered by its bizarre structure and its
19
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tion 1602 of the United States Code. 126 The FSIA codified the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity pursuant to the Tate
Letter,127 and is a limitation of the absolute sovereign immu-
nity doctrine. 128 In addition, FSIA eliminates the potential in-
ter-branch conflicts and the piecemeal approach in diplomatic
considerations, as evidenced by the judicial deference to the De-
partment of State Letters. 129 One of the chief purposes of the
FSIA is to promote uniformity of procedures of the United
many deliberately vague provisions, has during its brief lifetime been a financial
boon for the private bar but a constant bane of the federal judiciary." Id. In addi-
tion, the court noted that FSIA is "obtuse" and that it requires determination "of a
laundry list of purposefully ambiguous 'exceptions,' several of which were appar-
ently drafted without any regard for the jurisdictional consequences . .. all of
which present interpretative problems of varying degrees of difficulty." Id. at
1106.
126 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1994). The relevant portion of the law provides that:
Under international law, states are not immune from the jurisdiction of for-
eign courts insofar as their commercial activities are concerned, and their
commercial property may be levied upon for the satisfaction of judgements
rendered against them in connection with their commercial activities.
Claims of foreign states to immunity should henceforth be decided by courts
of the United States ....
Id.
127 See supra note 58; Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480,
488 (1983). See also Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 119 L.Ed.2d 394, 404-05
(1992); Alberti v. Empresa Nicaraguense De La Came, 705 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir.
1983); Asociacion De Reclamantes v. United Mexican States, 561 F. Supp. 1190,
1194 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd, 735 F.2d 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ((quoting H.R. REP. No.
1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 1976, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605) (the FSIA:
would codify the so-called 'restrictive' principle of sovereign immunity, as
presently recognized in international law.., the immunity of a foreign state
is 'restricted' to suits involving a foreign state's public acts (jure imperii) and
does not extend to suits based on commercial or private acts (jure gestionis).
This principle was adopted by the Department of State in 1952... [and] ...
is regularly applied against the United States in suits against the U.S. Gov-
ernment in foreign courts.)).
United Mexican States, 561 F. Supp. 1190, 1194.
128 Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. 480, 486-87. According to the Court in Verlinden:
Until 1952, the State Department ordinarily requested immunity in all
actions against friendly sovereigns. But in the so-called Tate Letter, (foot-
note omitted) the State Department announced its adoption of the "restric-
tive" theory of foreign sovereign immunity. Under this theory, immunity is
confined to suits involving the foreign sovereign's public acts, and does not
extend to cases arising out of a foreign state's strictly commercial acts.
Id. See supra note 58.
129 Id. at 488. See Asociacion De Reclamantes v. United Mexican States, 561
F. Supp. 1190, 1194 (D.D.C. 1983).
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States courts in suits against foreign states.130 However, this
purpose is defeated because there is no uniformity among the
courts in interpreting the statute. The act of state doctrine is a
discretionary rule involving considerations of judicial deference,
inter-branch conflicts, and implications of foreign relations. As
a result the FSIA is also undermined by the act of state doctrine
because a court is free to invoke that doctrine to decline hearing
a case.
131
The focus of the next stage of the analysis will be on the
cases interpreting the act of state doctrine and its exception, the
Hickenlooper Amendment. Moreover, the exceptions to sover-
eign immunity, as codified by FSIA §§ 1605132 and 1607,133 will
130 Mark B. Feldman, The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 in Perspective: A Founder's View, 35 IN'L & CoMP. L.Q. 302, 305 (1986).
131 Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C., 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985), see infra text ac-
companying note 144; Callejo v. Bancomer, SA., 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985), see
also infra text accompanying note 149.
132 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1994). The relevant portions of the statute are as follows:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts [if
either]: ... (2)... the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on
in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in con-
nection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that
act causes a direct effect in the United States [hereinafter commercial activ-
ity exception]; (3)... rights in property taken in violation of international
law are in issue and that property or any property exchanged for such prop-
erty is present in the United States in connection with a commercial activity
carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or that property or any
property exchanged for such property is owned or operated by an agency or
instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is
engaged in a commercial activity in the United States [hereinafter illegal
taking exception] ....
Id. There are other exceptions, discussions of which are eliminated because of
their limited utility for an expropriation victim. See, e.g., Asociacion De Recla-
mantes v. United Mexican States, 735 F.2d 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(interpreting
§ 1605(a)(4) and (5)), Freidar v. Government of Israel, 614 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y.
1985)(interpreting § 1605(a)(1)). The analysis of the provisions for the execution of
judgment and the attachment of property, § 1609, and its exception, § 1610, while
revelant, is beyond the scope of this article.
133 28 U.S.C. § 1607 (1994). The statute provides that:
In any action brought by a foreign state, or in which a foreign state
intervenes, in a court of the United States ... the foreign state shall not be
accorded immunity with respect to any counterclaim... (a) for which a for-
eign state would not be entitled to immunity under section 1605 ... had
such claim been brought in a separate action against that foreign state; or
(b) arising out of the transaction.., that is the subject matter of the claim of
21
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be emphasized, since in order to defeat a foreign government's
claim of immunity, an expropriation victim needs to find that
one of the exceptions from the statute applies. The FSIA is a
jurisdictional statute, because "[a]s a threshold of every action
... against a foreign state ... the court must satisfy itself that
one of the exceptions applies ... ."134 Furthermore, the FSIA
also supplies substantive federal law regarding foreign sover-
eign immunity.135
F. Case Law - Decisions Under the FSIA
The FSIA places the determination of whether to apply the
doctrine of sovereign immunity solely within the power of the
courts, thus removing the uncertainty of having to consult with
the Executive Branch. 13 6 However, even if the FSIA codified
the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, it did not reduce
the scope of foreign sovereign immunity.1 37 As the following
cases show, under the FSIA scheme, the expropriation victims
still face difficulties in obtaining jurisdiction and relief.
1. The Mexican Banks Nationalization Incidents
As a parallel to the Cuban expropriation cases, the nation-
alization of Mexican banks and the imposition of an exchange
control by the Mexican government in 1982 generated increased
litigation involving the act of state doctrine and the FSIA.138
The plaintiffs were United States investors who bought certifi-
the foreign state; or (c) to the extent that the counterclaim does not seek
relief exceeding in amount. . . from that sought by the foreign state.
Id. [hereinafter counterclaim exception]. See supra text accompanying note 67.
134 Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 493-94 (1983). See
also Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping, 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989)
(holding that Congress intended that the FSIA to be the sole basis for obtaining
jurisdiction over a foreign state), accord Republic of Arg. v. Weltover Inc., 119
L.Ed.2d 394, 403 (1992).
135 Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 497.
136 See, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983).
137 See supra note 108.
138 See, e.g., Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C., 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985); Callejo v.
Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985); West v. Multibanco Comermex,
S.A., 807 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1987). See Monroe Leigh, Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act, Commercial Activity and Expropriation Exceptions, Act of State Doctrine,
Second Hickenlooper Amendment, Imposition of Foreign Exchange Controls Not An
Expropriation, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 660 (1987).
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cates of deposit from private Mexican banks. 139 The Mexican
government nationalized the Mexican banks and imposed an
exchange control whereby the certificates of deposit were re-
deemed in pesos and in reduced rates of exchange. 140 Plaintiffs
sued on a breach of contract theory, alleging violations of fed-
eral securities law141 and illegal taking of property.142
In Braka v. Bancomer, S.N. C.,143 the court held that the act
of state doctrine barred the plaintiffs' claim.' 44 The court de-
cided the same way in Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 145 but in dic-
tum it held that pursuant to the commercial activity
exception, 146 the court had jurisdiction over the defendant Mex-
ican bank. 147 The Callejo court held that the defendant satis-
fied the third clause of FSIA section 1605(a)(2) 148 because it
carried on a commercial activity elsewhere which caused a di-
139 Braka, 762 F.2d at 223; Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1105; West, 807 F.2d at 822.
140 Braka, 762 F.2d at 223; Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1104; West, 807 F.2d at 822-23.
141 Braka, 762 F.2d at 223; Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1106.
142 West, 807 F.2d at 823.
143 Braka, 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985). Plaintiffs, United States citizens,
bought certificates of deposit from the defendant, a private Mexican bank. Id. The
funds for these purchases came from the plaintiffs' bank accounts with the defend-
ant in Mexico or from plaintiffs' checks payable from the defendant's New York
agent. Id. Before the maturity of the certificates, Mexico nationalized all its banks
and imposed an exchange control, as a result, plaintiffs' certificates of deposits
were devalued. Id. at 223.
144 Id. at 225. But see Allied Bank Intl v. Banco Credito Agricola, 757 F.2d
516, 522 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that "acts of foreign governments purporting to
have extraterritorial effect . . . should only be recognized if they are consistent
with the law and policy of the United States."); Optopics Laboratory Corp. v. Sa-
vannah Bank, 816 F. Supp. 898, 907 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that act of state
doctrine does not apply if the foreign state's act is contrary to the United States'
law and policy).
145 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985). Plaintiffs, United States citizens residing in
Texas, bought certificates of deposit from defendant, a private Mexican bank,
through funds transferred from their bank account in Texas. Id. at 1105. Subse-
quently, the Mexican government imposed an exchange control with the effect of
reducing the plaintiffs' certificates' value. Id. at 1106.
146 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994); supra note 132.
147 Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1107-08. The court announced a two prong test as fol-
lows: First, whether the suit is based on a commercial activity by the foreign state,
in other words, whether the relevant activity is commercial or sovereign in nature;
and secondly, whether the commercial activity have the requisite jurisdictional
nexus with the United States. Id.
148 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994). The relevant portions of the statute are as
follows:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts
[if]: ... (2) ... the action is based upon... an act outside the territory of the
23
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rect and foreseeable effect in the United States. However, the
plaintiffs' claims were dismissed because of the act of state
doctrine.1 49
In comparison, the court in West v. Multibanco Comermex,
S.A. 150 reached the same result, but on different grounds. First,
the Ninth Circuit held that the act of state doctrine presumes
the validity of the Mexican government's acts, even if it had ju-
risdiction according to the FSIA's commercial activity excep-
tion.151  Secondly, the court held that the Hickenlooper
Amendment15 2 applies as an exception to the act of state doc-
trine,15 3 but that the FSIA's illegal taking exception 54 does not
apply. This is so because "[v]alid expropriations must always
serve a public purpose; that public purpose... may ... render
lawful what otherwise might constitute a 'taking.' "155 Con-
versely, the court stated that a taking violates international law
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.
Id.
149 Id. at 1123-24. The court held that the incidents of the debt determine its
situs, and in determining the act of state doctrine, the ultimate question is
whether the ties of the debt to the foreign state is sufficiently close that the courts
will create hostility by not recognizing the acts of the foreign state. Id.
150 807 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiffs, United States investors, bought
certificates of deposits from defendants Mexican banks before Mexico's imposition
of exchange control. Id. at 822. As a result of Mexico's policy of redeeming the
certificates in pesos, plaintiffs suffered losses. Id. at 823.
151 Id. at 829. The court agreed with Callejo that it had jurisdiction pursuant
to the commercial activity exception. Id. at 825-26. But the plaintiff's breach of
contract claim ultimately failed on the merits. Id. at 826-27.
152 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1994); see supra note 86. Apparently, this tangible/
intangible property distinction has generated considerable controversy, see
Thomas S. Blackburn, Note, Attachment and Exception Disallowed Pursuant to
Intangible Claims, Brewer v. Socialist People's Republic of Iraq, 14 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. J. 711 (1991) (criticizing Brewer v. Socialist People's Republic of
Iraq, 890 F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that employment contract is intangible
property and, thereby, declined jurisdiction)).
153 West, 807 F.2d at 829-30. The court refused to draw the distinction be-
tween tangible and intangible property, and held that contractual claims are in-
cluded within the Hickenlooper Amendment. Id. Cf De Sanchez v. Banco Cent. de
Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1395 (5th Cir. 1985) (dictum stating that the FSIA
§ 1605(a)(3) and the Hickenlooper Amendment has the same focus on the expropri-
ation of property, therefore FSIA may not apply to intangible property). But see
Intercontinental Dictionary Series v. De Gruyter, 822 F. Supp. 662, 678 (C.D. Cal.,
1993) (holding that computer manuscripts are intangible property, hence not in-
cluded in FSIA § 1605(a)(3)).
154 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1994); see supra note 132.
155 807 F.2d at 831. See supra text accompanying note 53.
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if the confiscation discriminates against aliens,.5 6 or if it does
not provide for just compensation. 15 7
In sum, the plaintiffs who lost money on their certificates of
deposit because of the nationalization of Mexican banks have no
relief from the courts of the United States, despite the Hick-
enlooper Amendment and the FSIA. Braka and Callejo demon-
strate the continued vitality of the act of state doctrine in
depriving the expropriation victims of having their day in court,
the ineffectiveness of the FSIA in promoting uniformity of pro-
cedures, and the courts' inconsistencies in applying the FSIA.
The Callejo court correctly interpreted the FSIA's commercial
activity exception, 158 but that court was able to circumvent the
FSIA by invoking the act of state doctrine. Callejo shows that a
United States court can avoid the difficult issue of having to de-
cide that the foreign government had violated international law
by invoking the act of state doctrine. Callejo also demonstrates
that one of the purposes of the FSIA, to promote uniformity of
procedure, is undermined by the act of state doctrine.
The West court's interpretation of the Hickenlooper Amend-
ment as an exception to the act of state doctrine was sound.
However, its refusal to apply the FSIA's illegal taking excep-
tion 159 is not persuasive. 160 Any deprivation of a property inter-
est is a taking, regardless of whether the taking served a public
purpose or not.1 61 Consistent with the Cuban expropriation
cases, 162 Braka, Callejo, and West showed that an expropriation
victim suing a foreign state in a United States court will need to
156 Id. at 832. See supra text accompanying note 53.
157 Id. "An otherwise valid taking is illegal without the payment of just com-
pensation." Id. The court also quoted Letter from Cordell Hull, Secretary of State,
to the Mexican Ambassador (1940), reprinted in 3 HACKWORTH DIGEST OF INT'L
LAW 662: "[Tihe right to expropriate property is coupled with and conditioned on
the obligation to make adequate, effective, and prompt compensation. The legality
of an expropriation is in fact dependent upon the observance of this requirement."
See Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 888 (2d Cir.
1981). See supra text accompanying note 53.
158 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994); see supra note 132.
159 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1994); see supra note 132.
160 West, 807 F.2d at 831-32. This is so because the court qualified its holding
by stating that there is a limit beyond which an exchange control for a public pur-
pose may violate international law. Id. at 832.
161 Id. at 831. On the contrary, the court stated that "generally" a foreign gov-
ernment's implementation of exchange control is not a taking. Id. at 832.
162 See supra part III.D.
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surmount two barriers by fitting his or her case within the ex-
ceptions. The first barrier is determining whether the Hick-
enlooper Amendment acts as an exception to the act of state
doctrine. If the claim alleges a taking in violation of interna-
tional law, then the case is justiciable and can be heard by a
court. The second barrier is the sovereign immunity doctrine or
the FSIA. If any of the FSIA's exceptions apply, then a court
will have jurisdiction.
2. Other Post-FSIA Expropriation Cases
To reiterate, prior to exercising jurisdiction over a foreign
state, a court must find that one of the exceptions in the FSIA
applies. 163 The next stage of the analysis concentrates on the
FSIA and its effect on the courts' decisions regarding expropria-
tion claims.
a). Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta164
The court's approach in Gibbons is a typical way to deter-
mine whether any of the exceptions in the FSIA apply to pre-
clude sovereign immunity. The plaintiffs in Gibbons sued on
the theories of breach of contract, tort, and illegal taking of
property, inter alia, alleging that the instrumentalities of Ire-
land had harmed them. 165 The plaintiffs also argued that vari-
ous FSIA exceptions applied. 66 The court found both the
commercial activity exception 167 and the illegal taking excep-
163 See supra notes 132, 133 and text accompanying note 134.
164 549 F. Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
165 Id. at 1104. The dispute involved a breach of contract of a joint venture
between the plaintiffs and an instrumentality of Ireland in which the business in-
curred substantial loss. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant, an instru-
mentality of Ireland, had expropriated their intellectual property. Id.
166 Id. at 1106. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed FSIA § 1605(a)(1), (2) com-
mercial activity exception, or (3) illegal taking exception. Id. at 1106-07; see supra
note 132.
167 Id. at 1115. The court held that the test for commercial activity exception
depends on whether the cause of action is based on an act performed in connection
with commercial activity, which turns on whether the foreign state engaged in
commercial activity, and the relationship of the cause of action and the connected
commercial activity had to the United States. Id. at 1008-09. The court provided a
chart to illustrate this concept. Id. at 1108-09, 1112. Accord Callejo v. Bancomer,
S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1107-08 (5th Cir. 1985); see supra note 147.
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tion 168 applicable as it went through each FSIA exception. This
case shows that a plaintiff claiming expropriations may com-
bine such a claim with other claims to obtain jurisdiction pursu-
ant to the FSIA. Once a court finds that it has jurisdiction, the
expropriation claim can proceed on the merits along with the
plaintiff's other claims.
b). Alberti v. Empresa Nicaraguense De La Carne169
The plaintiffs in Alberti were United States corporations
that owned some stocks in a Nicaraguan corporation that had
been nationalized by the defendant Nicaraguan government. 1
70
The Seventh Circuit considered and summarily rejected the
plaintiffs' contentions1 7' under the commercial activity excep-
tion 172 and the counterclaim exception. 173 As for the illegal tak-
ing exception, 174 the court explained that "the expropriating
nation must provide 'prompt, adequate and effective' compensa-
tion, but there is little agreement on the meaning of these
terms."175 The court construed that "prompt" does not mean
immediate. 76 Though ultimately the foreign state has the bur-
den to prove immunity, this burden shifts to the plaintiffs if the
foreign state has proof that it acted in a public, sovereign capac-
168 Gibbons, 549 F. Supp. at 1107 n.4, 1111 n.7; 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1994);
see supra note 132.
169 705 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1983).
170 Id. at 252. After the nationalization, the plaintiffs ordered but refused to
pay for shipments of goods from the Nicaraguan corporation, instead, the plaintiffs
sued the nationalized Nicaraguan corporation and the Nicaraguan government.
Id. The plaintiffs sought to recover on the theory of conversion, and to offset the
value of the stocks in the nationalized Nicaraguan corporation against the ship-
ment of goods. Id.
171 Id. at 254.
172 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994); supra note 132.
173 28 U.S.C. § 1607 (1994); supra note 133. The plaintiffs committed tactical
error by seeking a declaratory judgement for the offset of the value of expropriated
property against the value of the shipment of goods. Alberti, 705 F.2d at 254. In-
stead, they should have waited until the defendants sued first; as the court noted
that when there is a pending trial in a state court, where the defendant brought
suit first, the plaintiffs may use the counterclaim exception. Id.
174 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1994); supra note 132.
175 Alberti, 705 F.2d at 255. But see supra notes 53 and 157 and accompanying
text.
176 Id. at 255.
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ity.' v7 The plaintiffs failed to sustain this burden, thus the
court'held for the defendant foreign state.178 This case shows
the similarity of the burden of proof between the act of state
doctrine and the FSIA, and that the shifting of the burden of
proof may be a pitfall for the expropriation victim.1 7 9 Tactical
consideration should also be taken into account to determine
whether to sue first, or adopt a wait-and-see posture 80 in order
to use FSIA's counterclaim exception.
c). Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co., v. Provisional Military
Government of Socialist Ethiopia81 '
Kalamazoo Spice is one of the few cases where the expropri-
ation victim prevailed. The facts are similar to Alberti,' 82 ex-
cept that here, the foreign state sued first, and the expropriated
defendant counterclaimed. 18 3 There were two issues in
Kalamazoo Spice. The first was whether the act of state doc-
trine applies if there is a treaty between the United States and
a foreign state.' 8 4 The Sixth Circuit held that where there is a
treaty between the United States and the foreign state which
provided for "just and effective compensation," 85 such a treaty
sets forth a generally agreed upon method of compensation
which provided a controlling legal principle. 86 The court rea-
soned that under the authority of Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
177 Id. at 255-56. Compare Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,
425 U.S. 682, 691-94 (1976); see supra text accompanying notes 100-101 (foreign
state has the burden of proof in the act of state doctrine).
178 Alberti, 705 F.2d at 256.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 254. See supra note 173.
181 729 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1984), aff'd on remand, 616 F. Supp. 660 (D.Mich.
1985).
182 705 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1983).
183 Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co., 729 F.2d at 423. The defendant, a United
States corporation, in a joint venture with the Ethiopian government, owned some
stocks of an Ethiopian corporation. Id.
184 Id. at 425.
185 Id. at 425. Compare supra notes 53 and 157 and accompanying text.
186 Id. at 425-26. Accord Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
429 (1964); see supra text accompanying notes 53 and 78. Compare Alberti v. Em-
presa Nicaraguense De La Came, 705 F.2d 250, 255 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that
there is disagreement as to the meaning of "prompt, adequate, and effective" com-
pensation); see supra text accompanying note 175.
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Sabbatino,18 7 there is a treaty exception to the act of state doc-
trine. s8 8 This is because a treaty supplies a legal standard,
reduces the possibility of conflict with the Executive Branch,
and thus removes the underlying rationales for the act of state
doctrine.' 89 Hence, this furthered the narrowing of the act of
state doctrine. 190
The second issue was the whether the FSIA's illegal taking
exception applied. 19' The court held that the expropriation vic-
tim must prove the three elements in the illegal taking excep-
tion: first, there must be rights in property at issue; 192 second,
the property must have been taken in violation of international
187 Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co., 729 F.2d at 425-26. See supra part
III.D.l.a; Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
188 The court reaches this through the specific language from Sabbatino stat-
ing that the act of state doctrine applies unless there is "a treaty or other unambig-
uous agreement regarding controlling legal principles . . . ." Kalamazoo Spice
Extraction Co., 729 F.2d at 425. See supra text accompanying notes 6 and 78.
189 Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co., 729 F.2d at 427.
190 In effect, there are five possible exceptions to the act of state doctrine.
First, the Bernstein Letter exception, where the Executive Branch issues a letter
suggesting to the court not to apply the doctrine. See supra notes 57 and 92. How-
ever, it is doubtful that this exception exist, as First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco
Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972) rejected it in a 5-4 opinion. Second, the
commercial activity exception, according to Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Re-
public of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976). Third, the Hickenlooper Amendment. See
supra note 86. Fourth, the combination of the Bernstein Letter exception, the ab-
sence of interference with United States' foreign relations, and the claim against
the foreign sovereign is asserted by way of counterclaim and does not exceed the
value of the foreign sovereign's original claim. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 884 (2d Cir. 1981). Fifth, the treaty exception,
according to Kalamazoo Spice. In the final analysis, however, this listing of possi-
ble exceptions to the act of state doctrine does not contribute towards the analysis
of the doctrine, because ultimately the doctrine is discretionary and is based on its
underlying rationales of avoidance of inter-branch conflict and international com-
ity. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 728 (1976)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying notes 14 and 23-25. More-
over, the act of state doctrine has close ties with the political question doctrine.
First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 787-88 (1972)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
191 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1994); supra note 132. Kalamazoo Spice Extraction
Co., v. Provisional Military Gov't of Socialist Eth., 616 F. Supp. 660, 662 (D.Mich.
1985).
192 Id. As for the first element, the court held that even if the property rights
at issue is an intangible property, such as stock ownership, it is still within the
statute. Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co., 616 F. Supp. at 663. Accord West v.
Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 829-30 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that
there is no distinction between tangible and intangible property). But see Inter-
continental Dictionary Series v. De Gruyter, 822 F. Supp. 662, 678 (C.D. Cal.,
29
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law; 193 and third, the jurisdictional nexus requisite in the stat-
ute must be met.194 The court held that the foreign state satis-
fied' all of the elements within the illegal taking exception. 195
Therefore, it did not have sovereign immunity. 196
Kalamazoo Spice shows that there is a treaty exception to
the act of state doctrine. It also demonstrates the application of
the FSIA's illegal taking exception. 197 It is a remarkable case
because the expropriation victim triumphed over the foreign
sovereign, in spite of the odds imposed by the act of state, the
sovereign immunity doctrine, and other obstacles.
d). De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua198
The facts of De Sanchez are similar to the Mexican banks
nationalization incidents. 99 The plaintiff claimed, inter alia,
that the commercial activity exception,200 or the illegal taking
exception 20 ' applied. In addressing the commercial activity ex-
ception, the Fifth Circuit held that the exception does not apply
where the defendant foreign state acts as a sovereignty. 20 2 In
1993) (finding that intangible property is not within the illegal taking exception).
See supra note 153.
193 See discussion supra part III.A.
194 Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co., 616 F. Supp. at 663.
195 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1994); supra note 132; Kalamazoo Spice Extraction
Co., 616 F. Supp. at 665. The court also applied the equitable principles from First
Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba to disregard separate
juridical entities between the Ethiopian government and the Ethiopian corpora-
tion. Id. at 666. See First Nat'l City Bank, 462 U.S. 611, 626-33 (1983); see supra
note 107 and accompanying text.
196 Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co., 616 F. Supp. at 662-65.
197 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1994); supra note 132.
198 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985). See also Monroe Leigh, Sovereign Immunity,
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Commercial Activities Exception, Expropriation
Exception, Tortious Activity Exception, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 658 (1986).
199 See discussion supra part III.F.1. The plaintiff, a Nicaraguan citizen,
bought a certificate of deposit from a private foreign bank. De Sanchez, 770 F.2d
at 1387.
200 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994); supra note 132.
201 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1994); supra note 132.
202 770 F.2d at 1391-95. The court noted that "[t]he commercial activity excep-
tion is the most frequently argued of the sovereign immunity exceptions." Id. at
1390. Moreover, the court announced a three part test: first, define the relevant
activity involved, focusing on the defendant's acts, and "whether the particular
conduct giving rise to the claim... constitutes or is in connection with commercial
activity.. . ."; second, "whether the relevant activity is sovereign or commercial - a
label which depends on the nature of the activity rather than on its purpose.";
third, "if the activity is commercial in nature ... whether it had the requisite
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addressing the illegal taking exception, the court indicated that
it is analogous to the Hickenlooper Amendment. 20 3 In the con-
text of an expropriation claim, the Hickenlooper Amendment
applies to limit the act of state doctrine, whereas the illegal tak-
ing exception limits the sovereign immunity doctrine. 20 4 The
court noted that a dispute between people of the same nation
does not involve international law,20 5 and where there is no vio-
lation of international law, the illegal taking exception does not
apply.20 6
e). Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina20 7
The plaintiffs in Siderman de Blake were a family that
lived in Argentina.208 Under the direction of a member of the
Argentine government, a group of militants terrorized the
plaintiffs and stole their property.209 Besides their claims of
torture and violations of human rights,210 they argued that the
commercial activity exception, 211 and the illegal taking excep-
tion21 2 precluded sovereign immunity. 21 3 The Ninth Circuit an-
alyzed the commercial activity exception, and agreed with the
jurisdictional nexus with the United States . .. [such as a] commercial activity
carried on in the United States... acts performed in the United States in connec-
tion with commercial activity elsewhere... [or] ... direct effects in the United
States of a commercial activity elsewhere." Id. at 1391. See supra notes 147 and
167.
203 See supra note 86.
204 De Sanchez, 770 F.2d at 1395.
205 Id. at 1395-96.
206 Id.
207 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992). See Philippe Lieberman, Note, Expropriation,
Torture, and Jus Cogens Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Siderman
de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 24 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 503 (1993).
208 Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 703.
209 Id. at 703-04.
210 Id. at 714-18.
211 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994); supra note 132.
212 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1994); supra note 132.
213 965 F.2d at 708.
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plaintiffs that it applied.214 In addition, the illegal taking ex-
ception applied.215
IV. SYNTHESIS
Gibbons,216 Kalamazoo Spice,217 and Siderman de Blake218
are among the relatively few cases where the expropriation vic-
tims passed muster. They surmounted the barriers and tight
scrutinies imposed by the act of state doctrine, as limited by the
Hickenlooper Amendment, and the sovereign immunity doc-
trine, as codified in the FSIA. These cases show that the facts
and merits in the particular circumstances were highly relevant
to obtaining jurisdiction under the FSIA scheme. This is so be-
cause the FSIA is modeled after American states' long arm stat-
utes, 219 and because the rationales of the sovereign immunity
doctrine focus on the avoidance of inter-branch conflict in for-
eign relations and the considerations of international comity.
Callejo,220 West,2 2 ' and Gibbons222 show that the facts of an
expropriation claim are determinative in the FSIA's commercial
activity exception 223 since that exception depends on the sub-
214 Id. at 708-11. The expropriated plaintiffs put forth evidence that Argentina
confiscated their property, which consisted of a hotel in that country. Id. More-
over, they alleged that Argentina continued to operate the hotel and profited from
American tourists who stayed in the hotel due to its advertisements and solicita-
tions in the United States. Id. The court opined that the facts presented a valid
claim that the defendant Argentine government had substantial contact and car-
ried on commercial activities so as to fit within the FSIA's commercial activity
exception. Id.
215 Id. at 711-12. The illegal taking exception applied because, according to the
plaintiffs allegation, Argentina took some assets, including the stock interests of
the hotel, from the plaintiffs' family business. Id. The Argentina government did
this without paying the plaintiffs for their loss. The court also quoted established
principles of international law from the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RE-
LATIONS LAw § 712. Id. See supra text accompanying note 54.
216 549 F. Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). See supra part lIH.F.2.a.
217 729 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1984), aff'd on remand, 616 F. Supp. 660 (D.Mich.
1985). See discussion supra part III.F.2.c.
218 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992). See supra part IlI.F.2.e.
219 See Mark B. Feldman, The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976 in Perspective: A Founder's View, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 302, 305 (1986).
220 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985). See discussion supra part III.F.1.
221 807 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1987). See discussion supra part III.F.1.
222 549 F. Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). See discussion supra part III.F.2.a.
223 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994); supra note 132.
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stantiality of contact. 224 The relevant inquiry is whether the
expropriation claim is sufficiently connected with a commercial
activity that the foreign state engaged in and whether the claim
and the commercial activity have sufficient ties with the United
States.225
In contrast, Alberti226 is a case where the court summarily
declined to apply the commercial activity exception 227 because
the claim was disconnected from the commercial activity.228
Whereas in De Sanchez,229 it was clarified that the sovereign or
commercial activity distinction is necessary. 230 This simply re-
flects on the origin of the FSIA, as grounded upon the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity, and manifested in the Republic
of Mexico v. Hoffman231 case and the Tate Letter.23 2 A sover-
eign state is not entitled to immunity for its commercial acts, as
opposed to its sovereign acts.
The courts in Gibbons,233  Kalamazoo Spice,234  and
Siderman de Blake23 5 correctly applied the illegal taking excep-
tion.23 6 The Kalamazoo Spice court's explicit listing and hold-
ing, and Siderman de Blake court's holding, pursuant to the
elements of this exception, ought to be considered by future
courts encountering this issue. In order to apply the illegal tak-
ing exception, a court needs to determine that the expropriation
victim's claim is based on some rights in property, that such
rights are taken in violation of international law, and that the
minimum jurisdictional nexus with the United States exists.
224 See Mark B. Feldman, The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976 in Perspective: A Founder's View, 35 Int'l & COMP. L.Q. 302, 305 (1986).
225 See supra notes 147, 167, and 202.
226 705 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1983). For a discussion of Alberti, see supra part
III.F.2.b.
227 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994); see supra note 132.
228 705 F.2d at 254.
229 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985). See discussion supra part II.F.2.d.
230 770 F.2d at 1391-92.
231 324 U.S. 30 (1945). See discussion supra part II.B.
232 See supra part III.B, and note 58 and accompanying text.
ns 549 F. Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). See supra part III.F.2.a.
2N 729 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1984), aff'd on remand, 616 F. Supp. 660 (D. Mich.
1985). See discussion supra part III.F.2.c.
235 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992). See discussion supra part III.F.2.e.
236 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1994); supra note 132.
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On the other hand, the construction of the illegal taking ex-
ception237 given by the court in West v. Multibanco Comermex,
S.A. 238 is misleading. It reasoned that if a taking serves a pub-
lic purpose, it is lawful under international law.239 This simply
is not the international law on expropriation, as international
law pursuant to the general agreements among experts and RE-
STATEMENT 2 40 both indicate that it is a violation of international
law if a taking is not for a public purpose, is discriminatory, or
is without just compensation. 241 The key word connecting these
requisites is the word "or". The significance of this is that even
though the taking is for a public purpose, if no compensation is
paid to the expropriation victim for his or her loss, or if the tak-
ing is discriminatory against citizens or corporations from a cer-
tain country, there is still a violation of international law on
expropriation.
Likewise, the Alberti24 2 court's explanation that there is lit-
tle agreement on the meaning of "prompt, adequate and effec-
tive" compensation 243 does not comply with the well established
international law on the standard of compensation in the expro-
priation context.244 The De Sanchez245 court is correct in terms
of its analogy of the Hickenlooper Amendment 246 as an excep-
tion to the act of state doctrine with the FSIA's illegal taking
exception,247 and its statement that a dispute between people of
the same nation does not involve international law.248 The di-
vergence of opinions in interpreting the FSIA's illegal taking ex-
237 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1994); supra note 132.
238 807 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1987). See discussion supra part 1II.F.1.
239 807 F.2d at 831; see supra text accompanying notes 150-157.
240 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 712 (1987); see discussion supra part III.A and text accompanying notes
53-54.
241 Id.
242 705 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1983). See discussion supra part III.F.2.b.
243 705 F.2d at 255; see discussion supra part III.F.2.b, and text accompanying
note 175.
244 See Davis R. Robinson, Expropriation in the Restatement (Revised), 78 AM.
J. INT'L L. 176 (1984) (explaining that "prompt, adequate, and effective" compensa-
tion is the international law on expropriation).
245 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985). See discussion supra part III.F.2.d.
246 See supra note 86.
247 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1994); supra note 132. 770 F.2d at 1395; see supra
text accompanying notes 203-204.
248 770 F.2d at 1395-96; see supra text accompanying note 205.
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ception 249 suggests that the FSIA has not served its purpose of
promoting the uniformity of procedures of the United States
courts in suits against foreign states. This problem, combined
with the court's discretionary application of the act of state doc-
trine, makes it impossible to predict whether an expropriated
victim can sue a foreign sovereign in a United States court.
As for the counterclaim exception, 250 the equity principles
embodied in the National City Bank of New York v. Republic of
China251 case are essential. Alberti,2 5 2 in comparison with
Kalamazoo Spice,253 shows that tactically, an expropriation vic-
tim may want to wait until the foreign sovereign sues first, so as
to use the FSIA's counterclaim exception to defeat the foreign
sovereign's immunity. National City Bank of New York v. Re-
public of China254 only applied the principles of equity as an
exception to the sovereign immunity doctrine with respect to a
counterclaim, but the principles of equity were again used in
First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de
Cuba255 to disregard the separate juridical entity status be-
tween a foreign government and a corporation essentially con-
trolled by that government. 256 These extensions of the equity
power of the courts indicate that considerations of fundamental
fairness should be evaluated in an expropriation claim. These
decisions also suggest that in applying the act of state doctrine,
courts should include in their deliberations principles of funda-
mental fairness to the expropriation victims, in addition to
other factors, such as the potentiality of inter-branch conflict
and international comity.
First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba257 il-
lustrates the scope of the Hickenlooper Amendment, 258 as does
249 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1994); supra note 132.
250 28 U.S.C. § 1607 (1994); supra note 133.
251 348 U.S. 356 (1955). See discussion supra part III.C.
252 705 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1983).
253 729 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1984), aff'd on remand, 616 F. Supp. 660 (D.Mich.
1985).
254 348 U.S. 356 (1955).
255 462 U.S. 611 (1983). See discussion supra part III.D.l.d.
256 See also Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Gov't of
Socialist Eth., 616 F. Supp. 660, 666 (D.Mich. 1985).
257 406 U.S. 759 (1972). See discussion supra part III.D.l.b.
258 See supra note 91.
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Alfred Dunhill,259 West, 260 and Kalamazoo Spice.261 They
demonstrate that the Hickenlooper Amendment is invaluable to
an expropriation victim in overcoming the act of state doctrine.
Finally, the expropriation victim does not have to prove
that any of the exceptions pursuant to the Hickenlooper
Amendment and the FSIA apply. The burden of proof does not
rest on the expropriation victim because the Supreme Court in
Alfred Dunhil 262 held that the foreign sovereign invoking the
act of state doctrine has the burden of proof. Similarly, the Al-
berti263 court held that the sovereign has to prove that it is enti-
tled to immunity. Placing the burden of proof on the foreign
sovereign is reasonable because the natural presumption is that
an expropriation case is justiciable and that a court will have
jurisdiction unless proven otherwise. But this placement of the
burden of proof did not provide an expropriation victim with
any advantage because of the shifting of burdens.
All of the cases illustrate the varied and inconsistent ways
in which courts decide the act of state doctrine and the FSIA
issues. They demonstrate the various FSIA exceptions and the
ways in which the sovereign immunity doctrine can bar the ex-
tension of jurisdiction. Lastly, the cases show how the FSIA is
influencing the jurisdictional reaches of the courts to hear ex-
propriation claims. Even if a court has jurisdiction because the
facts in any particular case fit within one of the FSIA's excep-
tions, the act of state doctrine operates to prohibit the expropri-
ation victim from litigating264  unless the Hickenlooper
Amendment applies.
In sum, the expropriation victim wishing to sue a foreign
sovereign must pass both the FSIA and the Hickenlooper
259 425 U.S. 682 (1976). See discussion supra part III.D.l.c.
260 807 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1987). See discussion supra part III.F.1.
261 729 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1984), aff'd on remand, 616 F. Supp. 660 (D.Mich.
1985); see supra part III.F.2.c. Technically, the Kalamazoo Spice court did not ad-
dress the Hickenlooper Amendment, but circumvented the act of state doctrine by
the treaty exception - the result is the same, the act of state doctrine no longer bars
the expropriation claim.
262 425 U.S. 682 (1976); see supra text accompanying note 100.
263 705 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1983); see supra text accompanying note 177.
264 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, § 455 C Comment (1987).
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Amendment hurdles prior to having his or her case 265 judged on
the merits. The result of the act of state doctrine and the incon-
sistent application of the FSIA means that the courts can have
plenty of leeway to escape from having to decide an expropria-
tion case which, in turn, means that an expropriation victim
will not be compensated for his or her loss. The United States
courts, by their unwillingness to adjudicate expropriation
claims, has ultimately caused an increased risk of loss in invest-
ing abroad by American corporations and individuals. 266
V. CONCLUSION
In most expropriation cases, the United States expropria-
tion victims suffered at the hands of the foreign sovereign. De-
spite the apparently illegal and inappropriate taking in most
instances, and despite the extensive codification of the common
law by the FSIA, the United States judiciary is reluctant to
grant any relief to the victims. The courts are powerless in
dealing with foreign affairs, and thus base their decisions on the
sovereign immunity and act of state doctrines. The considera-
tions of respect for the foreign government, judicial deference,
comity, and the ever elusive "equitable principles" also come
into play. This results in plenty of discretion for the courts.
How a case will be decided, or whether the court will assert ju-
risdiction, often depends on the specific facts of a case, the polit-
ical whirlwinds, and whether the United States has a favorable
or hostile foreign relation with that nation. A United States
claimant must tread carefully in any expropriation claim
against a foreign sovereign power. This is so because of the dis-
cretionary nature of the act of state doctrine and the courts' in-
consistencies in applying the FSIA's exceptions. As a result, no
265 The ABA and commentators concerned with this subject had advocated
abolishing the act of state doctrine. See e.g., Public Acts of State, the Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunities Act, and the Judiciary, 83 AM. Soc'Y INYL L. PRoc. 483, 487-92
(1989); Michael J. Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REV.
325 (1986); and Daniel C.K Chow, Rethinking the Act of State Doctrine: An Analy-
sis in terms of Jurisdiction to Prescribe, 62 WASH. L. REV. 397 (1987).
266 One can, of course, plan the investment so as to reduce the risk of expropri-
ation. For a helpful article on this subject see Philip R. Stansbury, Planning
Against Expropriation, 24 ITr'L LAw. 677 (1990). Alternatively, one can insure
against such risk, see S. Linn Williams, Political and Other Risk Insurance: OPIC,
MIGA, Eximbank and Other Providers, 5 PACE INT'L L. REv. 59 (1993).
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road map is sufficient to provide guidance into an uncharted
territory.
Ronald Mok*
* The author would like to dedicate this article to Kathy Lo, the Lo family
and Anthony Mok as an expression of his gratitude.
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